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COMMENT
THE SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE APPROACH
TO MOBILE HOME TAXATION
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade mobile homes have made an enormous impact
upon the housing market. Of 11.4 million new one-family units pro-
duced in the United States in the 1960's, 18.1 per cent were mobile homes.
Even these figures, however, do not reveal the importance of the mobile.
The mobile home accounted for only 8.4 per cent of the new single-family
housing units constructed in 1961. By 1965, mobiles comprised 18.3
per cent of this market, and by 1969 mobile homes represented 33.7 per
cent of all new one-family dwellings.' Moreover, in 1970, mobile homes
made up 95 per cent of all single-family homes sold for less than $15,000;
72 per cent of those sold for less than $20,000; 61 per cent of all those
sold for less than $25,000; and 45 per cent of the total number of single-
family units sold.2
The size of the mobile unit has increased along with its popularity. In
1961, 98.5 per cent of all mobiles produced were 10 feet wide; corres-
pondingly, 82.2 per cent were 50 to 59 feet in length. 3 Thus, the floor
space of most 1961 models was approximately 500 to 590 square feet.
By 1970, 99.2 per cent of all constructed mobile homes were at least 12
feet wide, 20.6 per cent being wider. In addition, 78.6 per cent were 60
to 70 feet in length. The average mobile home constructed in 1971
measured 12 feet by 64 feet, with a living area of 732 square feet.4
It is easy to speculate why the mobile home has experienced such
growing popularity. The price per square foot has declined from $10.75
in 1961 to $8.75 per square foot in 1970. 5 At the same time, the cost
of a conventional home has increased to $16 per square foot. This dif-
1. F. BAIR, MOBILE HOMES AND THE GENERAL HOUSINo SUPPLY 3 (1970).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONVENTIONAL HOMES--CONSTRUCTION RE-
PORTS C-25-70-Q4 (1971).
3. F. BAIR, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Mobile Homes Manufacturers Ass'n, Flash Facts 3, June, 1971.
5. Mayer, Mobile Homes Move Into The Breach, FORTUNE, March, 1970, at
144.
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ference is reflected in the comparative costs: while the average mobile
home sold for $6,110 in 1970, the median single-family conventional
house was priced at $26,200, including land." Because of the substan-
tial difference in their prices, the down payments required for the two
types of homes are quite disparate. Based on a 20 per cent down pay-
ment the mobile home purchaser paid an average down payment of
$1,222; the corresponding conventional house purchaser paid $5,240
down on his new home. Many people, especially young married cou-
ples, simply do not have the down payment required for a conventional
home. For these persons the mobile home provides a safe and decent
alternative-probably a more spacious alternative-to apartment living.
In addition, the American of the 1970's finds himself a much more
mobile being than his predecessor. Job demands, investment opportun-
ities and personal desires cause the modem American to switch domiciles
often, and correspondingly, to feel less rooted to any particular home,
neighborhood or city. Since the mobile home is transportable, the mod-
ern American can feel that if a change of environment is indicated, he
can take his mobile home with him. Also, the individual who simply
anticipates a possible change in location in the not-too-distant future
may feel considerably more secure assuming a seven-year mortgage, the
usual term on a mobile home, than a twenty or thirty-year mortgage on
a conventional house. If the mobile home owner desires to change resi-
dencies, the seven-year mortgage will be more easily paid off or assumed
by a prospective buyer than will the twenty-year mortgage. Of course,
he may decide to take his home and his remaining mortgage payments
with him.
Because of its low cost and/or its mobility, the mobile home appeals
primarily to young families-the group of persons most desirous of de-
cent housing. Most current figures reveal that 49.4 per cent of the heads
of all mobile home households are thirty-five years of age or less. These
families generally have less children, especially children of school age,
than their conventionally housed counterparts. The median mobile home
family has 2.49 persons; the national median is 2.85 persons per family.7
In addition, only 27 per cent of mobile home families had children of
school age, that is, between six and eighteen years of age. Moreover,
more recent statistics based on regional surveys show the same small
ratio of school age children per mobile home. A study conducted by
6. Mobile Homes Manufacturers Ass'n, supra note 4.
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING SURVEYS-
PARTS 1 and 2, Occupants of New Housing Units; Mobile Homes and the Housing
Supply 66-67 (1968).
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the Michigan Municipal League found that in Macomb County, Michi-
gan, while mobile homes average .52 children per unit, the average
dwelling unit contains 1.7 children. s A survey conducted throughout
New England concludes:
Households without children are the most common mobile home dwellers.... Mo-
bile homes, with their modem plumbing, appliances and new furnishings, fulfill the
housing expectations of some newly married couples much better than the older
homes they could afford. 9
The increase in the number of mobile home households in the United
States has elicited much interest as to the proper way to tax the mobile
home. Generally, there are four types of taxes imposed upon the owner of
the mobile home. These are: a real property tax, a personal property
tax, a license fee and a privilege or use tax. While most states impose
only one of the above taxes upon the mobile home dweller, some states
levy a combination of two or more such taxes upon him. The purposes
of this comment are to examine these various approaches to mobile home
taxation and to demonstrate that the privilege tax is the most feasible of
these approaches.
More specifically, this comment will indicate problems associated with
three of the above taxes. The mobile home is not "real property," and
therefore the imposition of a real property tax upon it is unsound. In
addition, the methods used to compute and collect the personal property
tax are ill-suited to an efficient mobile home taxation system. Finally,
the license fee approach often discriminates against the conventional
home owner and in favor of the mobile home owner by imposing a minis-
cule tax upon the mobile home. None of the above problems is found in
the properly drafted privilege tax statute. It is this lack of defects,
rather than any inherent suitability, which makes the privilege tax ap-
proach the most effective approach to mobile home taxation.
OVERVIEW OF MOBILE HOME TAXATION STATUTES
Classifying the statutory tax approaches to mobile homes presents sev-
eral problems. First, there are so many approaches enunciated by the
various state statutes that accurate classification demands that such ap-
proaches be placed into many general categories. In addition, the large
increase in the number of mobile home dwellers has provoked much de-
bate in the state legislatures as to the proper method to tax mobile
8. R. Hegel, Mobile Home Zoning, Building And Site Regulations, and Taxa-
tion-Implications for Michigan Municipalities 51, July 1970.
9. Greenwald, Mobile Homes in New England, NEw ENGLAND ECONOMIC
REV., May/June 1970, at 6.
homes; such debate has produced many recent changes in the law. Thus,
any current survey runs the risk of being quickly outdated. Nevertheless,
a classification is beneficial to a proper understanding of mobile home
taxation.
Currently, nine states place a special privilege or use tax on mobile
homes. 10 Nine states impose a license fee on the mobile home unrelated
to its value,"1 while five states levy an ad valorem license fee on the
home.' 2  Six states tax the mobile home as real property.' 3  Ten states
subject the mobile home to personal property taxation, three by way of
a specific state statute, 14 the others by way of implication from general
10. Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3-4(f), 13-3-5 (16 & 17) (Supp.
1969) (specific ownership tax of 2.30 percent, sliding scale to tenth year at .85
percent; $25 minimum); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , § 725 (1972) (privi-
lege tax of 10 to 15 cents per square foot of floor space); Iowa: IowA CODE ANN.
§ 1350.22 (Supp. 1971) (semi-annual tax of 10 cents per square foot for first five
years, 90 per cent of the above for the 6th-9th years, and 80 per cent of the
above thereafter); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13(3) (Class 2A), 168.012
(9)(a)(b) (Supp. 1970) (regular property tax rate; home assessed at 10 per cent
of its value, down to 51/2 per cent if 4 years and older; minimum assessment of
$2,000); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE, § 57-55-04 (Supp. 1971); Ohio:
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.06 (Supp. 1970) (based on purchase price with a
depreciation scale; minimum of $36); South Dakota: S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN.
3H 10-9-9, 10-9-14 (1967) (taxed at same rate as personal property); Washing-
ton: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 82.50-2 (Supp. 1971) (annual excise tax of 2 per
cent of market value with a $2.00 minimum); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-311
(c)(i) (Supp. 1971) (3 per cent use tax).
11. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.200(6) (1970) ($4.00 annually); Ken-
tucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.270 (1962); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. § 47:462
(1970); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 140, § 32G (Supp. 1971)
($6.00 monthly fee); Michigan: Micu. STAT. ANN. § 5.278(71) (1971) ($3.00
monthly fee); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1-d, 40:52-2 (Supp. 1971);
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. H3 64-3-2(g), 64-3-6(f) (1953); North Carolina:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-89(c)(5) (1963); Virginia: VA. CODE 33 35.64-1,
35.64-5 (1950).
12. California: CAL. REV. & TAX CODE ANN. § 10753.2(e) (West 1956) (2
per cent of market value; home assessed at 85 per cent for first year, depreciated
to 15 per cent for eighteenth year); Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. 3H 60-1601,
77-1240.01 (1966); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 47-22.5(m)(n)(o)(p),
tit. 68-2101 to 68-2109 (Supp. 1971); Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. 33 481.460,
481.471 (1969) (2 per cent of value or $10.00, whichever is greater); Wisconsin:
Wis. STAT. ANN. 66.058(3) (Supp. 1971) (taxed at same rate as other property).
13. Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 14-1930 (Supp. 1970); Maine:
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 551-1482.B (Supp. 1970); Maryland: MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 19(2)(c) (1957) (as long as permanently attached land); Mon-
tana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-101 (third), 84-301 (Class four (b)), 84-
302 (Supp. 1971); New York: N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX § 102(g) (McKinney 1960);
Texas: TEX. CIVIL STAT. art. 7146 (Vernon Supp. 1971) (provided owner of
mobile home also owns the land on which it rests).
14. Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-641 (Supp. 1969); Indiana: IND.
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property taxation statutes.' Some states provide alternative methods of
taxation. Depending on circumstances, the mobile home is subject to:
a real or personal property tax in Mississippi,' Pennsylvania, 17 and Con-
necticut;' 8 real property taxation or a license fee in Florida 9 and Kan-
sas; 20 or a personal property tax or license fee in Alabama 21 and Mis-
souri.2 2  Two states imply some sort of taxation, but give no hint as to
the type, by requiring a permit which will be issued only upon proof of
payment of all appropriate taxes. 23 Finally, an inspection of the statutes
of two states reveals no data on the subject of mobile home taxation.24
THE REAL PROPERTY APPROACH
There are various approaches to the taxation of mobile homes as real
property. While an analysis of the statutes of all states 25 which always
or sometimes tax mobile homes as real estate is necessary for a total un-
derstanding of the real property approach, a discussion of several statutes
suffices to raise the important issues involved with such an approach. In
Pennsylvania, the mobile home is taxed as real property to the owner
of the home only when it is permanently attached to the land.26  Texas,
on the other hand, taxes the owner of the mobile home with a real prop-
erty tax, regardless of whether the home is attached to the land.2 7  Fi-
ANN. STAT. § 64-622(a) to 64-622(i) (Bums 1961); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 361.561 to 361.5644 (1968).
15. Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-133.1 (1947), and § 84-406 (Supp.
1969); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 63-1201, 63-1203 (1947); New Hampshire: N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-7-a (Supp. 1971); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-501 (Supp. 1970); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-1 (1953); Vermont: VT.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2802, 32-5079 (Supp. 1971); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 11-5-1 (1966).
16. Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 10007-71 to 10007-78 (Supp. 1970)(personal property tax if land not owned; taxed as real property if land owned
and home permanently attached to land).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5020.201, 5453.201, 5453.617(a) (1971).
18. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-63(a) (Supp. 1971).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.081 (1968), § 320.0815 (Supp. 1971).
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-143(5), 79-101 (Supp. 1970).
21. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 704 (1), (2) (Supp. 1969).
22. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 137.090, 144.550 (Vernon Supp. 1970).
23. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2707 (Supp. 1970); South Carolina: S.C.
CODE §§ 46-100.0 to 46-100.5 (Supp. 1970).
24. Hawaii and Rhode Island.
25. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5020.201, 5453.201, 5453.617(a) (1968).
27. TEx. CIVIL STAT. art. 7146 (Vernon Supp. 1971).
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nally, New York includes the value of any mobile home, attached or not,
in the assessment of the land on which it rests, regardless of who owns
the land. 28 Of the three approaches, Pennsylvania's is the most theo-
retically acceptable. First, it taxes only the owner of the mobile home
and thus avoids any due process or equal protection conflicts which arise
when someone other than the owner is taxed. Second, Pennsylvania
treats only mobile homes permanently attached to the land as real estate.
The definition of real property has always encompassed land and
those objects permanently affixed to land. Real property
consists of such things as are permanent, fixed, and immovable, as lands, tene-
ments, and hereditaments of all kinds, which are not annexed to the person, or can-
not be moved from the place in which they subsist. 2 9
Case law has generally adhered to such a definition, and stressed perma-
nent attachment as an indispensable element of real property.30 Thus,
theoretically, if a mobile home is permanently attached to land, it is real
property.
Once it is accepted that a mobile home permanently attached to the
land is real property, the question becomes what constitutes permanent
attachment. Certainly, a mobile home which has lost its mobile charac-
teristics by its actual physical attachment to a foundation and the re-
moval of its wheels has become so attached. The few courts which have
considered the question have agreed uanimously. 31
In 1939, New York became the first jurisdiction to confront the im-
movable mobile object. 32  Plaintiff brought a lunch wagon onto some
land, removed its wheels, and placed it upon a brick foundation built into
the ground. He then connected the wagon with water, gas, and electrical
outlets . The local assessor treated the wagon as real property, and sent
the plaintiff an appropriate bill. 33  Upon plaintiff's objection, the court
held the assessment valid because, "when an improvement such as this is
made it (the wagon) is taxable as real property as long as it remains on
the land." 34
28. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX § 102(12g) (McKinney 1960).
29. 42 AM. JuR. Property § 13 (1942). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1383 (4th
ed. 1951) defines real property as, "Land and generally whatever is erected or
growing upon or affixed to land."
30. See, e.g., Jilek v. C. W. & F. Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943);
Woodworth v. Franklin, 85 Okla. 27, 204 P. 452 (1922).
31 People ex rel. Herzog v. Miller, 170 Misc. 1063, 11 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1939),
aft'd, 258 App. Div. 724, 15 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1939); Coyle Assessment, 17 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 149 (1958); State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969).
32. People ex rel. Herzog v. Miller, supra note 31.
33. People ex rel. Herzog v. Miller, supra note 31 at 1064, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
34. People ex rel. Herzog v. Miller, supra note 31, at 1064, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
1972] 1013COMMENT
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The Pennsylvania court considered the issue in 1958.35 Three mobile
homes rested upon plaintiff's land-he owned one himself and his chil-
dren owned the other two. All the homes were connected to utility out-
lets and rested upon concrete blocks. The wheels of all three homes had
been removed. The land assessment included the value of all three
homes, and the plaintiff objected to such assessment.3 6 In upholding the
assessment, the court found that, based upon all the relevant circum-
stances, such homes were permanently attached to the land and, thus,
were to be treated as real property for tax purposes.37
Most recently, in 1969, the Washington Supreme Court had to decide
the issue of when a mobile home became permanently attached to the
land.3  Defendant bought a mobile home, removed its axles, wheels,
and hitch, placed it upon a permanent concrete block foundation, and
attached it to water, electric, and sewerage services. Subsequently he
was convicted of violating a zoning statute which prohibited the per-
manent placing of an immobilized vehicle upon residentially zoned land.39
Overruling his conviction, the court held that when a mobile home loses
its mobile characteristics and thus becomes permanently attached to the
land, it becomes real property within the scope of the zoning laws.40
Thus, there is little theoretical argument against taxing mobile homes
as real property when they are physically and permanently attached to
the land. The law, however, recognizes another type of permanent at-
tachment, something akin to constructive attachment. That is, when a
person places an object on the land with the intention that it become
part of the land, that object becomes part of the realty. 41
Probably the best illustration of constructive attachment lies in the
area of fixtures. According to the fixture doctrine, articles become part
of the land if such annexation is reasonable after a balancing of three
criteria: (1) the degree of physical attachment; (2) the appropriate-
ness of the realty to the article attached; and (3) the intention of the
35. Coyle Assessment, supra note 31.
36. Coyle Assessment, supra note 31 at 151.
37. Coyle Assessment, supra note 31 at 152.
38. State v. Work, supra note 31.
39. State v. Work, supra note 31 at 205, 449 P.2d at 806-07.
40. State v. Work, supra note 31 at 207, 449 P.2d at 808-09.
41. 42 AM. Jtm. Property § 29 (1942). "But ordinarily that which is in its
nature otherwise personal, when . . . constructively attached by its use or intended
use with the soil, becomes a part of the realty. Among the principal criteria for
determining whether property remains personalty or becomes realty are . . . the
intention of the parties." See also Lavenson v. Standard, 80 Cal. 245, 22 P. 184
(1889) and Jenkins v. McCurdy, 48 Wis. 628, 4 N.W. 807 (1890).
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parties. 42 However, the modern trend is to focus almost exclusively on
the intention of the parties, and to consider the other two criteria mainly
as evidence of such intent. 43  Consequently, if a person intends that his
structure become permanently attached to the land, it accedes to and be-
comes part of the realty.
Several cases are illustrative. In Royal Store Fixture Company v.
Patten,44 plaintiff sold one Zaroff a frozen custard stand and related
equipment under a conditional sales agreement. Zaroff in turn placed the
stand upon defendant's land under a lease, and connected it to water and
electric lines as well as to a cesspool. Zaroff defaulted in his payments
to both plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff brought an action in replevin
against defendant who answered that the stand had acceded to the realty
as a matter of law, and that title consequently rested in him.45 The court
held that as long as the stand could be removed without material injury
to the land, the intent of the parties determined if it acceded to the real
estate. After considering all the circumstances, the court ruled that
there was no intent to permanently attach and that title therefore be-
longed to the plaintiff. 46
A similar case is Sigrol Realty Corporation v. Valcich.47 One Wilmore
owned land upon which .tenants had placed frame bungalows. These
bungalows rested on cinder blocks and were connected to water and
electrical outlets. Wilmore sold the land to plaintiff who, upon expiration
of the leases, brought an unlawful detainer action against defendant-
tenants. When defendants attempted to remove the bungalows, plaintiff
instituted an action to declare that title to the bungalows was in him,
since they had become permanently attached to, and therefore part of,
the land.48 The court held that the bungalows were realty or personalty
depending upon the agreement (intent) of the parties, and that the evi-
dence indicated that the bungalows remained personalty and did not ac-
cede to the land. 49
42. See generally 22 AM. JUR. Fixtures § 3 (1939) and the numerous cases
cited therein.
43. See generally 22 AM. JUR. Fixtures § 6 (1938). See also Lesser. v.
Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 198 A. 252 (1938); Thomson v. Smith,
111 Iowa 718, 83 N.W. 789 (1900); Hanson v. Ryan, 185 Wis. 566, 201 N.W.
749 (1925).
44. 183 Pa. Super. 249 (1957).
45. Id. at 251-52.
46. Id. at 254-56.
47. 12 App. Div. 430, 212 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1961) ajfd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 668,
225 N.Y.S.2d 748, 180 N.E.2d 904 (1962).
48. Id. at 431, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26.
49. Id. at 432, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
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The Pennsylvania courts have applied this intent criteria in deciding
whether mobile homes not actually physically affixed to the land might
nevertheless be permanently attached thereto for real estate tax pur-
poses." In a recent case, 51 a mobile home owner had maintained his
home on the same site for over three years, and had connected it to
various utility outlets. The court held that these, together with all the
other circumstances, indicated that the owner intended to permanently
attach his mobile home to the land. Consequently, a real estate tax
levied on such owner was valid. 52
An earlier decision by a higher Pennsylvania court applied the same
intent test but arrived at a different conclusion. In Streyle v. Board of
Property Assessment, Appraisal, and Review,-" ' the owner of a mobile
home park objected to the land assessment which included the value of
various mobile homes resting on the land5 4 (this assessment was made
prior to the currently effective Pennsylvania law55 which prohibited such
an assessment against anyone not owning the land upon which the home
rests). The homes had been located on the land for various lengths of
time, and were connected to water and gas lines, but were not actually
physically annexed to the land. The court held that, judging from the in-
tentions of the parties involved, the homes were not permanently at-
tached to the land and could not be subjected to real estate taxation.5 6
Thus, in accordance with fixture cases and the general constructive at-
tachment doctrine, a mobile home can be classified theoretically as real
property, provided that its owner intends it to be permanently attached
to the land. Of course, mobile homes which are actually physically
attached to the land are properly designated real property. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania statute which provides that a real property tax be levied on
all owners of permanently attached mobile homes cannot be attacked suc-
cessfully by any legal argument. The Pennsylvania statute is both valid
and sound.
50. Lantz Appeal, 199 Pa. Super. 310, 184 A. 2d 127 (1962); Streyle v. Board of
Prop. Assess., App. & Rev., 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410 (1953); Harman v.
Fulton County, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 611 (1960); Fryer Appeal, 81 Pa. D. & C. 139(1951); Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1950).
51. Loash v. Berks County Assessment Bd., 55 Berks 104 (1963).
52. Id. at 105.
53. 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410 (1953).
54. Id. at 324-25, 98 A. 2d at 411.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.617a (1968).
56. Supra note 53, at 326-27, 98 A.2d at 412. Accord, Kinkella v. Board of
Prop. Assess., App. & Rev., 173 Pa. Super. 329, 98 A.2d 413 (1953).
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The Texas approach is similar to the Pennsylvania approach in that it
taxes only owners of mobile homes. However, the Texas statute makes
no distinction between permanently attached and non-attached mobile
homes-all are treated as real property for tax purposes.5 7 This is ob-
jectionable because mobile homes do not fit the traditional definition of
real property.
The courts, in the absence of a statute which defines mobile homes
as real property, have agreed that a mobile home is not real property.
For example, in Fryer Appeal,5 8 the value of various mobile homes in a
trailer park was included in the assessment of the land for real property
tax purposes. The owner of the park objected to such assessment, as-
serting that the homes were personalty and not realty. 59  The court
agreed and voided the assessment saying, "[i]t is not necessarily the
extent to which such personal property is attached to the real estate but
the intention of the parties to make it part of the real estate that con-
trols."' 60  Thus, a mobile home is inherently personalty and not real
property. Unless it is somehow permanently attached to the land-either
actually or constructively, i.e., with the owner's intent-it is illogical to
treat the mobile home as real property. 6 1
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in accordance with Penn-
sylvania. 62  In one instance plaintiff bought some land from defendant,
who was living in a mobile home located on such land. Although con-
nected to utilities, the home was on its wheels and easily transportable.
When defendant removed the home, plaintiff sued in breach of contract,
claiming that such trailer had been annexed to the realty and was there-
fore included in the sale.6 3 The court held that the home was not real
property because of its inherent nature as personalty and its lack of
permanent attachment to the land.6 4
New York has also considered the problem65 and ruled that despite
57. Tax. CIVIL STAT, art. 7146 (Vernon Supp. 1971).
58. Fryer Appeal, 81 Pa. D. & C. 139 (1951).
59. Id. at 139-40.
60. Id. at 141.
61. See Stewart v. Carrington, 203 Misc. 543, 119 N.Y.S. 2d 778, (S. Ct. 1953);
Streyle v. Bd. of Assess., App. and Rev., supra note 53; Kinkella v. Board of Prop.
Assess., App. & Rev., supra note 56; Hartman v. Fulton County, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d
611 (1961); Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1950).
62. Clifford v. Epsten, 106 Cal. App. 2d 221, 234 P.2d 687 (1951).
63. Id. at 222-23, 234 P.2d at 687-88.
64. Id. at 225, 234 P.2d at 690.
65. Panarello v. Board of Assessors, 64 Misc.2d 967, 316 N.Y.S.2d 403 (S. Ct.
1970).
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the statute that classifies mobile homes as real estate for tax purposes,66
under certain circumstances trailers remain personalty. Plaintiff had
modular homes on his land for display and sale purposes only. The
homes were unoccupied, unconnected to utilities, and not affixed to
foundations. Nevertheless, the value of such homes was included in the
tax assessment of the land.67 The court ruled the assessment invalid on
the ground that unoccupied and unattached mobile units were not real
estate. 68
By treating the mobile home as real property, even when it is not
permanently attached to the land, Texas and other states69 are creating
a legal fiction. While fictions are plentiful in our law, they are generally
considered a necessary evil rather than a desirable commodity. The
American legal system has adopted the fiction that legislatures may tax
personalty as real estate provided there is some rational basis for so
doing.70 In fact, this proposition is so well entrenched 7l that it is difficult
to attack. This adoption, however, does not make the fiction any more
acceptable to the legal theorist. The fictional law is always inferior to
the pure law, provided, of course, that the desired end is achieved by
either. The desired end of a fictional law which levies a real property
tax on mobile homes is the raising of revenue. This end can be accom-
plished by other means-such as by the imposition of a privilege tax-
which would leave our law undiluted. Therefore, one must conclude that
the Texas approach is inferior despite its validity.
The New York approach goes one step further. 72  New York not only
treats all mobile homes as real property for tax purposes, it also levies
such tax on the owner of the land upon which the homes rest, even
though he is usually someone other than the mobile home owner. Thus,
66. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX § 102(g) (McKinney 1960).
67. Supra note 65, at 968, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04.
68. Supra note 65, at 968, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
69. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 14-1930 (Supp. 1970).
70. See e.g., U.S. v. Town of Marlborough, 305 F. Supp. 718 (D.C. N.Hamp.
1969); Johnson v. Roberts, 102 Il. 655 (1882); Portland Terminal Co. v. Hinds,
141 Me. 68, 39 A.2d 5 (1944); Application of New York Telephone Co., 257 App.
Div. 415, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 359, appeal granted 257 App. Div. 1099, 14 N.Y.S.2d 1005,
af'd New York Telephone Co. v. Ferris, 282 N.Y. 667, 26 N.E.2d 805 (1940).
71. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 67 (1954). "It is entirely competent for the legisla-
ture, for the purpose of taxation, to make realty that which would be personal
property at common law, and vice versa, and, as defined for purposes of taxation,
the term 'real property' may include things which should generally be regarded
as personal property."
72. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx § 102(g) (McKinney 1960).
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in New York, a person is taxed for property he does not own. This is so
repugnant to our general conception of due process and equal protection
of the laws that even the New York courts had difficulty accepting the
statute.
Beagell v. Douglas"3 was the first case which confronted the applica-
tion of this statute. In Beagell, plaintiff was the owner of a mobile home
park whose land assessment included the value of mobile homes owned
by his tenants. He challenged the constitutionality of the then recently
passed statute which provided for such an assessment.74 The court hast-
ily dismissed plaintiff's argument and held that since, "[t]he legislature
has the power to classify and define what property is taxable as real
property, '75 the statute is valid. 76
During the same year Beagell was decided, another New York court
considered the statute in Erwin v. Farrington.77 In this case, the park
owner, who had been assessed for the value of the trailers belonging to
his tenants, passed the tax onto his tenants. The tenants refused to pay
and the landlord sued for breach of a covenant in the lease which pro-
vided that the tenant pay all taxes assessed on all constructed objects on
the premises. 78  While not specifically declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional, the court held for defendant-tenants and stated, "a tenant by as-
suming in a lease the payment of taxes which shall be subsequently levied
upon the demised premises does not thereby obligate himself to pay any
taxes which may be illegal and void."' 79 This language is somewhat
vague; at the very least, however, the court indicated its suspicion of the
statute.8
0
The highest New York court settled the controversy six years later.
New York Mobile Home Association v. Steckel8' had the same facts as
Beagell. The court responded to plaintiffs allegation that he was being
taxed for property belonging to another and therefore was being de-
prived of due process by drawing an analogy to the taxation imposed
upon a landlord whose tenant constructs a building on the leased premis-
73. Beagell v. Douglas, 2 Misc.2d 361, 157 N.Y.S.2d 461 (S.Ct. 1955).
74. Id. at 362, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
75. Id. at 363, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
76. Accord, Feld v. Hanna, 4 Misc. 2d 3, 158 N.Y.S.2d 94 (S. Ct. 1956).
77. 285 App. Div. 1212, 140 N.Y.S.2d 379 (S. Ct. 1955).
78 Id. at 1212, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
79. Id. at 1212, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
80. See also Barnes v. Gorham, 12 Misc.2d 285, 293-95, 175 N.Y.S.2d 376,
385-86 (S.Ct. 1957) where the court expressed similar suspicion but specifically
-'tied the statute invalid because of potential hardship.
81. 9 N.Y.2d 533, 215 N.Y.S.2d 487, 175 N.E.2d 151 (1961).
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es. When a lessor rents land to a lessee who puts a building upon such
land, the court reasoned, the value of such building is included in the as-
sessment of the land. The landlord, in turn, can pass the tax onto the
lessee, the one who should rightfully pay the tax, by a rent increase or an
amendment to the lease. Thus the landlord is not deprived of any prop-
erty.8 2 "So too in the instant situation, the trailer park owner has the
means at his disposal, by way of rent, to allocate the increased tax upon
the owner of the trailer-the individual who rightfully should pay for
it.,,s3
With this decision New York became the first and leading state to tax
the mobile home park owner for property he did not own. So contrary
is this conception to the gist of due process that few cases lend themselves
to discussion. The Steckel court itself found only one analogous prece-
dent, that of the landlord whose tenant constructs an improvement upon
the land. s4
The improvement analogy is a dangerous one. An owner of a mobile
home park runs a much higher risk of being unjustly saddled with the
real estate tax than does the landlord (for convenience sake hereinafter
referred to as the conventional landlord) whose tenant builds a truly
permanent improvement upon the land. First of all, assessment dif-
ficulties arise. The conventional landlord can easily determine what
portion of his tax is attributable to the tenant's building. All he need
do is subtract the unimproved tax bill from the current bill which in-
cludes the value of the improvement; the difference is the portion as-
sessed to the improvement. More importantly, the entire amount due to
the increased assessment can be passed on to a single tenant. The mo-
bile home park owner can likewise easily compute the portion of the tax
levied on the various mobile homes. It will be practically impossible for
him, however, to justly apportion the total increase among his tenants.
Any mobile home park contains homes of widely divergent values. The
owner of the $12,000 mobile home should pay twice the tax as the owner
of the $6,000 home, and one and a quarter times the tax of the owner of
the $9,000 home. If the park owner is to pass on the tax fairly, he must de-
termine the value of all the homes and tax each in proportion thereto.85
82. Id. at 539, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 491, 175 N.E.2d at 154.
83. Id. at 539, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 491, 175 N.E.2d at 154.
84. This is generally the law. See e.g., People ex rel. Van Nest v. Commis-
sioners of Taxes and Assessments, 80 N.Y. 573, 577 (1880); Fort Hamilton Manor,
Inc. v. Boyland, 4 N.Y. 2d 192, 198, 173 N.Y.S.2d 560, 564, 149 N.E.2d 856,
858-59 (1958).
85. See Carter, Problems In The Regulation and Taxation of Mobile Homes,
48 IOWA L. REV. 16, 54 (1962).
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In addition, the conventional landlord runs no risk of being left without
recourse if the tenant fails to pay the tax-provided of course that agree-
ment for such payment has been reached. The tenant's building is at-
tached permanently to the land and, in case of default, the landlord has
a lien on such building. The mobile home park owner has no such se-
curity. While a similar lien may attach to the mobile home, it is still
mobile and may be quickly transported. A park owner who is not ever-
alert might find his security has left the state. The conventional tenant
may expatriate to Argentina, but his building remains in New York; the
expatriate mobile home tenant takes the landlord's security with him.
Plaintiff in Steckel attempted to convince the court of the unconstitu-
tionality of the New York statute with reference to another analogy,
that of a person being taxed for the income of another. The case of
Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner16 is the leading case on point. Wisconsin
passed a statute which declared that a husband and wife must file an in-
come tax return whereby the total tax due would be that computed on
their combined average taxable income. Plaintiff husband and his wife
each had substantial incomes. Due to the graduated nature of the tax,
i.e., the higher the income the higher the tax rate, the plaintiff would pay
a substantially lower tax if he and his wife filed separate returns. Plain-
tiff paid the higher tax in accordance with the statute and sued for a re-
fund, asserting that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 87  The court ac-
cepted plaintiff's argument and struck down the statute. Ruling that it
was a violation of due process to tax one person with reference to the
property of another, the court stated:
[W]e have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions which underlie
our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or
income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process
of law as guaranteed by the the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 8
Although the Steckel court summarily rejected plaintiff's analysis 89 as mis-
placed, it is as logical and valid as the land improvement analogy which
it used as the rationale for its decision. The Supreme Court and com-
mon experience dictate that it is a violation of due process of law to tax
one man for the property of another, but the Steckel decision allowed ex-
pediency to dictate the upholding of a statute which accomplishes just
that.
86. Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner, 284 U.S 206 (1931).
87. Id. at 213.
88. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
89. Supra note 81, at 540, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 492, 175 N.E.2d at 155.
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Thus, the New York approach is objectionable in several respects.
First, it classifies all mobile homes as real property for tax purposes.
This is at best an unnecessary and therefore undesirable fiction which
dilutes our law. Second, it taxes one for the property of another which
is at best illogical and, quite possibly, a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. One might be willing to accept New York's
approach if no other means were available to insure that mobile home
owners pay their fair share of taxes. Unfortunately, New York is un-
able to make such a claim. Simple expediency is the real basis for its
statute.
Despite legal objections to taxing mobile homes as real property, sev-
eral knowledgeable authors advocate the real property taxation ap-
proach. 90 Generally, the rationale underlying such an approach is that,
"[p]roperty taxes should affect equally all those who own similar kinds
of property." 91 This rationale is often termed the horizontal equity doc-
trine, and is quite attractive as a general principle of law. Many in-
equities arise, however, when the doctrine is applied to mobile homes.
An examination of the horizontal equity approach as expounded by two
of its chief proponents is illustrative.
Berney and Larson define horizontal equity to mean that, "people in
like circumstances should be taxed in a similar manner. ' 92 Since mobile
home owners and conventional home dwellers are in "like circum-
tances," they assert, both should be taxed in a similar manner-a real
property tax should be levied on their homes. Both classes are in "like
circumstances" because of the similarity in (1) income, and (2) the type
of shelter in which they live. The authors determine that mobile home
owners have incomes and shelters similar to their conventionally housed
counterparts based on this analysis.
The mobile home owners of Arizona are classified into occupational
categories; the heads of all households are appropriately placed within the
same categories. It is assumed that the median income level for any
occupational category is appropriate for Arizona's mobile home families.
Therefore, the median income for each occupational category is multi-
plied by the number of mobile home household heads who fit within each
90. Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
491 (1970); Berney & Larson, Micro-Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics With
Implications for Tax Policy, 42 LAND ECON. 453 (1966); Comment, Toward an
Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation, 71 YALE L. J. 702
(1962).
91. Bartke & Gage, supra note 90, at 520.
92. Berney & Larson, supra note 90, at 458.
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category. The totals for each category are added and the sum is divided
by the total number of mobile home families. The resulting quotient is
the average income for a mobile home household. A similar computa-
tion is performed to determine the average income for all Arizona fam-
ilies within the labor force. A comparison of the two figures reveals
marked similarity of average incomes. The average income of a mobile
home family is only $29 less than the average income of all households.
Thus, "similarity" of income is proved.93
As for similarity of shelter, the authors cursorily conclude that mobile
homes, despite their dual nature, are dwelling units which provide "shel-
ter." With little explanation, it is asserted from this that mobile homes
should be taxed as all other types of shelter; a real property tax should be
levied upon them. 94
Robert Rooney uses a supply and demand argument to refute Berney
and Larson.9" Since the cost of a mobile home is relatively low, a small
tax increase will have a great effect on the total ownership cost of such a
home.96 With the higher cost of mobile home living, many people who
might usually purchase mobile homes will instead buy conventional
houses. This increased number of purchasers in the market will drive
the already high cost of conventional housing even higher. Corres-
pondingly, the housing shortage will become more critical than it is al-
ready. Finally, the increased cost of a home will be reflected in its
higher assessment figure for tax purposes, and consequently a higher tax
will be imposed on the home. Thus, the end result of imposing real
property taxation upon mobile homes will be: a more acute housing
shortage, a higher initial cost of a conventional home and a higher real
property tax for all home owners.97
Other attacks can be made on the real property taxation approach to
mobile homes. First of all, while it is true that the concept of horizontal
equity underlies much of our tax policy, it is not the only concept con-
sidered in determining that policy. The benefits-received theory is also
somewhat influential. According to this theory, persons are taxed com-
mensurate with the benefits they receive from the taxing body. Mobile
home dwellers receive considerably fewer benefits from local government
93. Berney & Larson, supra note 90, at 456.
94. Berney & Larson, supra note 90, at 459.
95. Rooney, Micro Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics with Implicationsfor Tax Policy: A Reply, 44 LAND ECON. 414 (1968).
96. The author computes the interest to be as high as 11 percent. Id. at 415.
97. Berney & Larson, Micro Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics with Im-
plications for Tax Policy: Rejoinder, 44 LAND ECON. 417 (1968).
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agencies than do other home owners. Because of the fewer number of
children per home, especially children of school age,98 mobile home own-
ers may already be contributing more per household to public schools
than their conventionally housed counterparts. 9  In addition, the pav-
ing and upkeep of all streets within the mobile home park are paid for
by the park owner. 10 0 Besides garbage pickup (which sometimes is paid
for by the owner) the only immediately noticeable benefits the mobile
home owner receives are police and fire protection. In any medium to
large sized urban area, the added expense of providing such protection to
mobile home residents must be minimal. It is recognized that the bene-
fits-received approach should not be the basic concept underlying our
tax policy-such an occurrence would place a most undesirable and im-
practical tax burden upon the poor-nevertheless, it should be consid-
ered before deciding the proper approach to mobile home taxation.
Even if the horizontal equity concept is summarily accepted, the propo-
sition that mobile home owners and conventional home owners are in
"similar circumstances" is heartily disputed. Berney and Larson assert
that mobile homes are similar to other houses because their primary func-
tion is to provide shelter; this is undeniable. However, to conclude there-
from that mobile home dwellers must pay a real estate tax because those
who live in "all other types of shelter" pay such a tax is subject to
debate. All persons who live in sheltered areas do not pay real property
taxes. People who live in apartments do not pay real estate taxes;
neither do those who live in hotels or boarding houses. Why is a mobile
home owner the only sheltered entity who should be considered "in like
circumstances" with a home dweller? Moreover, the mobile home owner
is more "similar" to an apartment dweller than he is to a conventional
home owner. The home owner has a fee simple title to a plot of ground
which affords him security for money lending ventures. The mobile
home owner has no such title and no such security. While the land own-
er may not be thrown off his land, the mobile home owner, like the
apartment dweller, rents space. At the landlord's or park owner's whim,
such space may not be available upon the expiration of the lease.' 0 '
98. See previous textual material accompanying supra notes 8 and 9.
99. "[B]ecause of the type of people this mode of living attracts, mobile home
dwellers may require fewer services than the population at large. . . . This seems
particularly true of schools, which are heavily supported by local property taxa-
tion." Bartke & Gage, supra note 90, at 521.
100. Interview with Mr. and Mrs. A. Bleau, owners of various mobile home
parks in Indiana and Illinois, in Oak Lawn, Illinois, Nov. 17, 1971.
101. Most mobile home owners rent space on a month-to-month tenancy agree-
ment.
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Correspondingly, rent increases may be frequently imposed upon mobile
home and apartment devotees, but the conventional home owner never
suffers increased mortgage payments. Generally, there seems to be little
basis from which to conclude that mobile home residents are any more
like conventional home owners than are apartment dwellers. If hori-
zontal equity demands that all those living under shelter pay a real prop-
erty tax, then those who live in apartments, hotels, and boarding houses
should pay the same tax.
The Berney and Larson conclusion that mobile and conventional
households have similar incomes is likewise debatable. The income sim-
ilarity which they compute is based upon the assumption that a mobile
home resident with a particular occupation makes the same median in-
come as all others with that occupation. This assumption is false be-
cause of two facts: (1) Within every occupation there exists a wide
range of income levels which are usually parallel with the ages of the
persons within the occupation-the older the worker, the higher his earn-
ings; (2) the average mobile home owner within the labor force is con-
siderably younger than his conventionally housed neighbor. The Bureau
of Census figures previously cited indicate that 43.4 per cent of the heads
of all mobile home households are less than 35 years old; only 23.6 per
cent of all home owners lie within this age range. It is fundamental
that the prime earning years for an American are those between his 36th
and 54th birthday. With few exceptions, the 30 year old salesman, law-
yer, or truck driver makes considerably less than his 46 year old col-
league. 10 2 Thus, it is inaccurate to apply the median income levels of
any occupation to mobile home owners who fall disproportionately within
the lower strata of the income ranges of nearly every occupation.
Nationwide studies prove the fallacy of the Berney and Larson con-
clusion. The latest available Census Bureau statistics show that the me-
dian family income level for mobile home dwellers is only $6,620, while
the all family median is $7,440.103 This is a difference of roughly $800
or 13 per cent per family-quite a substantial difference. Thus, mobile
home and conventional home owners are not similar with respect to in-
come. Since mobile home and conventionally housed residents are not in
"similar circumstances" (concerning either type of shelter or income),
horizontal equity does not demand that they be taxed the same way.
One further reason makes the real property taxation approach un-
desirable. Mobile homes currently provide safe and decent housing for
102. Heroux, Results and Analysis of the 1971 Illinois Bar Economics Survey,
1971 ILLINOIS BAR J. 182 (Nov. 1971).
103. Supra note 7.
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many persons who have no reasonable alternative.10 4  Almost 60 per
cent of the mobile home households heads in America either are under 35
or retired.' 05 The median income of these young people and retirees is
probably less than the $6,640 median of all mobile home families. Even
accepting that figure as representative, however, certain calculations are
striking.
The United States Government bases its housing policies upon the
proposition that no more than one-quarter of a person's income should be
spent on decent housing. 10 6 Such a figure, while probably slightly lower
than the average's actual housing expense, represents a reasonable goal
for all families. According to a recent study conducted throughout New
England, 107 the average mobile home owner allocates $159.15 per
month for housing expense while the owner of a conventionally mort-
gaged $24,000 home expends $221.35 per month. Based on such statis-
tics, which should be fairly representative of national levels since they
encompass large expensive urban areas such as in Boston, as well as de-
pressed rural areas such as in Maine, the mobile home owner with an in-
come of $6,640 (the median level) spends 29 per cent of that income on
decent housing. If he bought the corresponding conventional home, his
housing expense would be 40 per cent-an unreasonable if not prohib-
itory figure. Moreover, it is the tax difference which produces most of the
disparity in the monthly expense figures. The survey indicates that $46
per month of the difference is due to the tax variations. If the tax is
substantially increased, the mobile home resident will be forced to find
alternate forms of housing, in all likelihood, an apartment. With apart-
104. "Since conventional builders are virtually unable to build single-family
houses priced at less than $15,000-and there aren't many less than $20,000 ei-
ther-the mobile home is just about the only option available to families with
less than incomes of $8,000 or so who want to own their own homes." Mayer,
supra note 5, at 126. In a similar vein, Presidential Advisor Pierre Rinfret states:
"We are developing a new industry that the stock market has just discovered.
I discovered it three years ago. I said then that here is an answer to housing in
the United States. It's called mobile homes. For six thousand dollars I can produce
an eighteen-by-sixty foot home, put it on six concrete blocks and on the land,
and it will cost the buyer twenty-five dollars a month [rent]. And that is better
housing than I can get from trade union construction for twenty thousand dollars."
Pros and Cons of Inflation, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, at 65-66 (May, 1969).
105. Supra note 7.
106. The National Housing Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(s)(d) (Supp. 1970),
which provides for rent supplements for lower income families, states: "The
amount of the annual payment with respect to any dwelling shall not exceed the
amount by which the fair market rental for such unit exceeds one-fourth of the
tenant's income." See also Low Rent Housing § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. 1970).
107. Greenwald, supra note 9, at 4.
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ment rents as exorbitant as they are in most urban areas, such a person
will be unlikely to find comparable housing for $159.15 per month. Con-
sequently, his only alternatives are: (1) Rent a safe, decent, but ex-
tremely tiny apartment; or (2) rent a larger but unsafe apartment in a
depressed area. Either alternative is inferior to his more spacious and
tenantable mobile home.
Thus, even if one is convinced that mobile homes are similar to con-
ventional homes, he might conclude that social necessity demands a dif-
ferent tax approach to mobile homes. The mobile home provides the
only alternative for decent housing for an increasing number of young
married or older, retired couples. It may not be able to continue to pro-
vide such an alternative if it is taxed like something it is not-real prop-
erty. 108
THE PERSONAL PROPERTY APPROACH
While personal property may be defined in many ways, mobility is one
characteristic encompassed by nearly every definition. Black's Law Dic-
tionary, for instance, defines personalty as "movable property."' 10 9 Ac-
cording to the legal encyclopedia, Corpus Juris Secundum,
They (pieces of personal property) have been defined as goods, money, and all other
movables which may attend the person of the owner wherever he may think proper
to go, which is the definition given by Blackstone of 'things personal,' or as goods
and chattels. They have been defined as property of a personal or movable nature
as opposed to property of a local or immovable character.110
The mobile home, because it is a movable chattel, fits within the general
definition of personal property. An early commentator on mobile home
taxation, James H. Carter, along with numerous others,"' designates it as
such: "Unless it is permanently affixed to the ground in such a manner
that it must be considered part of the realty under local property law, the
mobile home obviously constitutes personal property." 112  The courts
have agreed."11
108. At least one study shows that owner-occupied homes pay a much smaller
share of local taxes than is commonly thought: "Putting these various figures
together, one arrives at the rather surprising conclusion that only about an eighth
of the urban government bill is currently collected in the form of local property
taxes on owner-occupied homes." Marvel, Paying the Urban Bill, 54 NAT. CIV.
REV. 16, 18-19 (1965).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (4th ed. 1951).
110. 73 C.J.S. Property § 8 (1951).
111. See e.g., B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 110 (2d
ed. 1964); Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 125, 134
(1961).
112. Carter, supra note 85, at 50.
113. Stewart v. Carrington, supra note 61 (1953); Streyle v. Bd. of Prop. Assess.,
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In one example, prior to the passage of the current New York mobile
home taxation statute, plaintiff-park owner's land was assessed for real
property taxation purposes to include the value of various tenants' mobile
homes. He objected, claiming that the homes were personalty and that
taxing them as real property was unconstitutional. 1 14  The court agreed
with plaintiff and held that since mobile homes are personal property,
the attempted levy of a real property tax upon them was unconstitu-
tional. 115
In Hortman v. Fulton County," 6 plaintiff owned a mobile home which
rested on his land. The home was connected to utilities, and its wheels
were removed. It was not, however, attached to any foundation. Plain-
tiff objected to having a real property tax levied on the mobile home.
The court stated that the unit was movable and therefore personal prop-
erty and, correspondingly, that the real property tax levied upon it was
invalid. Applying the "movable chattels are personal property" concept,
the court held that "[h]ouse trailers are initially personal property, and
they do not become real estate simply because people reside in them."' 1 7
Thus, it must be conceded that legally mobile homes are classified
properly as personalty. Correspondingly, the statutes which impose a
personal property tax upon the owner of a mobile home are quite valid
and constitutional. Certain practical difficulties, however, make the per-
sonal property tax approach less than ideal. In some states these diffi-
culties are acute, while in others they are negligible.
First of all, many states, such as New York, simply do not tax personal
property. Others, such as Tennessee," 8 seemingly in an effort to have
corporations and not individuals bear the burden of the personal property
tax, allows exemptions of as much as several thousand dollars to the own-
er of personal property. If an individual owns a $6,000 mobile unit, a
$2,000 exemption will lessen his tax substantially. Still other states, or
rather counties within certain states, neglect to enforce their personal
property taxation statutes. In all these situations, the mobile home owner
may not be paying his fair share of municipal costs." 9
App. & Rev., supra note 53; Kinkella v. Bd. of Prop. Assess., App. & Rev., supra
note 56; Hartman v. Fulton County, supra note 50; Fryer Appeal, Tupra note 58;
Mason Appeal, 75 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1950); Loash v. Berks County Assessment Bd.,
supra note 51.
114. Stewart v. Carrington, supra note 61 at 544, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
115. Stewart v. Carrington, supra note 61 at 546, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
116. Hartman v. Fulton County, supra note 50.
117. Hartman v. Fulton County, supra note 50 at 614.
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502 (Supp. 1970).
119. Despite the suspicion, at least one author claims that, even under present
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In addition, the personal property tax machinery is often ill-adapted to
the problem of equitably assessing a mobile home. Personal property
taxation statutes typically empower the assessors initially to assess a piece
of property commensurate with its manufacturer's suggested retail price.
Such an assessment is just only when all or most purchasers of the prop-
erty have paid that price. Such a procedure is practical only when the
assessor can easily discover the price.
Machinery, which assesses by the manufacturer's suggested retail price
procedure, functions best when assessing property which is produced in
large volumes, preferably in standard models, by a few large manufac-
turers. In such situations, the prices are easily acquired by the assessor-
each manufacturer submits one suggested price for each of the several
standard models produced. Moreover, because he is buying one of a
large quantity of models sold from a large manufacturer, the purchaser
will have little bargaining power. Consequently, he will most likely pay
a price fairly equal to the suggested retail price. For example, the per-
sonal property taxation machinery works ideally when taxing American
automobiles. The assessor can easily compile the suggested retail
prices-each of the several large automotive corporations submits the
suggested price for each of its models. In addition, the assessor can be
relatively certain that the purchaser pays a price similar to that recom-
mended by the manufacturer-most "Pinto" buyers pay the nationally
advertised manufacturer's suggested retail price.
The machinery does not function so smoothly when assessing the mo-
bile home. First, mobile homes are currently being produced by approx-
imately 245 different manufacturers. 120  Each manufacturer, besides
producing several standard models, also constructs an increasing number
of homes built to the order of the purchaser. Thus, compiling the manu-
facturer's retail price for the various mobile homes within a taxing dis-
trict requires a considerable amount of time and effort, neither of which
may be available to the personal property assessor. Moreover, the sug-
gested retail price often fails to reflect the actual price which a mobile
home purchaser pays. Consequently, an assessment based on the sug-
gested price is unjust. The disparity between suggested and actual prices
tax laws, mobile homes do pay their fair share: "Balancing local expenditures
against revenues per dwelling unit, single family detached housing is generally found
to require greatest subsidy, garden apartments and mobile home parks come
closer to paying their own way, and high density (and particularly high-rise)
apartments turn in a substantial surplus." Bair, Mobile Homes-A New Challenge,
32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 286, 301 (1967).
120. Mayer, Mobile Homes Move Into the Breach, FORTUNE, March, 1970, at 126.
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is due primarily to the fact that most mobile home park owners are also
dealers who rent space only to those who purchase mobile homes from
them. The park owner is selling a location, a place to live, as well as a
mobile home. Consequently, the value of a desirable location is often
included in the price of a mobile home. An owner of a park located in
a desirable area-desirability being measured by tangibles such as prox-
imity to transportation, employment opportunities, and shopping and rec-
reational facilities, as well as intangibles such as the social or moral pro-
files of other tenants within the park-will charge a substantially higher
price for the same model than will the owner whose park is located in a
depressed area. Thus, if the assessment is to be just, the suggested retail
price must be adjusted so that it accurately reflects the true value of the
home. The traditional personal property tax statute does not provide the
persons or funds necessary of such an adjustment.
Other assessment difficulties may present themselves after the initial
assessment. Depreciation tables based on the age of the property, for ex-
ample, may be extremely accurate when applied to chattels built in ac-
cordance with the philosophy of planned obsolescence. The mobile
home, however, is neither designed nor built with an eye toward obsoles-
cense. Consequently, the table which depreciates property on a yearly
basis may prove quite inaccurate, and the subsequent assessment based
on such a table will be unjust.
Thus, practical difficulties often accompany the personal property ap-
proach for the taxation of mobile homes. Therefore, in spite of the fact
that mobile homes are inherently personalty, to tax them as personal
property is not the most desirable taxation approach.
THE LICENSE FEE APPROACH
Eighteen states provide that a license fee must or may be imposed upon
mobile homes within the state boundaries. 12  Under its police power, a
state, in order to provide for the general welfare of its citizens, may regu-
late anything that might affect their welfare. The power to regulate in-
cludes the power to levy license fees upon the regulated entity or activity.
Such a license fee is valid as long as it bears a reasonable relationship to
the cost of regulation. It is presumed that the license fee does bear a
reasonable relationship to the cost of regulating the licensed entity or
activity. However, if it is proved that the license fee levied bears no such
relationship, the fee is an unauthorized revenue measure and therefore
invalid. 1 22
121. Seesupra notes 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, & 22.
122. See Village of Roxanna v. Castanzo, 41 Ill. 2d 423, 243 N.E.2d 242
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License fee statues and ordinances passed in reliance upon such stat-
utes have been challenged by various licensees, including mobile home
and mobile home park owners. Most of the statutes withstand the rea-
sonable relationship test and are upheld as valid. The following fees
imposed upon park owners have been so upheld: a $500 annual fee; 12 3 an
annual fee of $15 per mobile home within the park; 24 an annual fee of
$200 plus one dollar per trailer within the park;' 25 a levy of $6 per
trailer per month; 126 an annual fee of $5 per mobile unit; 127 an annual fee
of $500 levied on the first 50 spaces within the park plus $5 for each
space thereafter; 28 an annual fee of $200 plus $2 per home within the
park;129 a fee of $100 per year plus $1 per week for each occupied home
within the park; 8 0 an annual fee of $110 per mobil unit within the
park;131 and a levy of $200 per year."12 License fees of $5 per year183
and $10 per month1 4 levied directly upon the mobile home owner have
likewise been upheld.
Certain statutes and/or ordinances, however, have been held invalid
because they procured revenue in excess of regulatory costs and thus con-
stituted unauthorized revenue measures. A lead case decided by the
Virginia Supreme Court is County Board of Supervisors v. American
(1969); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Fadely, 183 Kan. 803, 332 P.2d
568 (1958); Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144
(1959); City of Richmond Heights v. Lo Conti, 19 Ohio App. 2d 100, 250 N.E.2d
84 (1969); Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969); Hoefling v.
City of San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228, 20 S.W. 85 (1892); City of Charlottesville v.
Marks Shows, 179 Va. 321, 329, 18 S.E.2d 890, 895 (1942). See also 53 CJS
Licenses § 19a (1948).
123. City of Chicago v. Schall, 2 Ill.2d 90, 116 N.E.2d 872 (1954).
124. Michaels v. Township Committee of Pemberton Tp., 3 N.J. Super. 523, 67
A.2d 324 (1949).
125. Edwards v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Moonachie, 3 N.J. 17, 68
A.2d 744 (1949).
126. Konya v. Readington, 54 N.J. Super. 363, 148 A.2d 868 (1959).
127. White v. City of Richmond, 293 Ky. 477, 169 S.W.2d 315 (1943).
128. Monmouth Jn. Mobile Home Pk. v. South Brunswick Tp., 107 N.J. Super.
18, 256 A.2d 721 (1969).
129. Bellington v. Township of East Windsor, 17 N.J. 558, 112 A.2d 268
(1955).
130. Karen v. Town of East Haddam, 146 Conn. 720, 155 A.2d 921 (1959).
131. Chandler Services, Inc. v. Florida City, 202 S. 2d 11 (Fla. 1967).
132. Nelson Cooney & Son, Inc. v. South Harrison Tp., 57 N.J. 384, 273 A.2d
33 (1971).
133. People v. Stewart, 204 Misc. 490, 122 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1953).
134. Barnes v. City of West Allis, 275 Wis. 31, 81 N.W. 2d 75 (1957).
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Trailer Co.13 5  A Virginia statute authorized counties to regulate mobile
home parks and provided that such counties could impose a license tax to
enforce such regulation. A county levied a license fee of $50 per mobile
home lot per year upon all park owners. A trailer company sought a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the fee. 13 6  After weighing the
facts, the court found that the ordinance bore no reasonable relationship
to the cost regulation. Consequently, the court held the statute invalid,
stating the general criterion for validity. "If it is manifest that the amount
imposed is out of proportion to the expenses involved, the ordinance will
generally be regarded as a revenue measure and void as a regulation un-
der the police power."' 3 7
An interesting case which was similarly decided was County Commis-
sioners of Arnee Arundel County v. English.'38 After holding that a fee
of $30 per year per trailer levied upon the park owner was invalid as a
license fee enacted under the police power because it was unrelated to the
cost of regulation, the court considered classifying the fee as a use tax.
The court reasoned that since the fee was imposed upon the only use to
which the mobile home could be used, the fee could not be classified as a
use tax. Consequently, the court held that the fee must be treated as a
property tax and was invalid because not levied on an ad valorem ba-
sis.13 9
There is no theoretical legal objection to the license fee approach when
the fee imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the cost of regulation.
One serious warning, however, must be sounded. A narrow interpreta-
tion of cost of regulation might emasculate the license fee approach. The
mobile home owner should pay his fair share of all municipal services,
regardless of whether he actually benefits from such services. If cost of
regulation is defined to encompass only the costs of services which the
municipality actually performs for the mobile home dweller and excludes
the costs of other services, such as the expense of operating schools and
hospitals which the average mobile home owner may not use, the result-
ing license fee will discriminate in favor of the mobile home owner. A
more reasonable and liberal interpretation of cost of regulation--one that
135. County Bd. of Sup'rs. v. American Trailer Co., 193 Va. 72, 68 S.E.2d
115 (1951).
1.36. Id. at 73-74, 68 S.E.2d at 117.
137. Id. at 76, 68 S.E.2d at 118. Accord, Hoffman v. Borough of Neptune
City, 137 N.J.L. 485, 60 A.2d 798 (1948).
138. County Com'rs of Arnee Arundel County v. English, 35 A.2d 135 (Md.
1943).
139, Contra, Rapa v. Haines, 64 Ohio Abs. 535, 101 N.E.2d 733 (1951).
includes school and hospital expenses, for example, within its definition-
should produce a license fee rate which is fair and equitable to all resi-
dents of a municipality. If the license fee statute or ordinance is inter-
preted to insure that mobile home dwellers pay their fair share of the
cost of municipal services, the license fee approach provides a fair and
equitable approach to mobile home taxation.
CONCLUSION
Summarizing, the real property, personal property, and license fee
structures are inappropriate for the levying of an equitable tax upon the
mobile home. The mobile home is not "real property" and characterizing
it as such creates a needless legal fiction. Dispute over who should pay
the real property tax imposed upon the mobile home also makes the real
property approach inappropriate. Because the mechanical aspects of a
personal property tax are not efficient when applied to mobile home taxa-
tion, the personal property approach is likewise inappropriate. Finally,
the license fee approach is inadequate because of the tendency to inter-
pret "license fee" so narrowly that the mobile home owner does not pay
his fair share of the tax burden.
While there is nothing inherently equitable about a privilege tax, such
a tax can most easily address itself to the particular problems of taxing a
mobile home. By adopting a tax structure which focuses strictly on the
mobile home, any state can avoid the problems associated with the real,
personal and license fee approaches. The privilege tax is designed only
for mobile home taxation purposes and contains (if properly drafted) ap-
praisal, depreciation and rate schedules appropriate for the mobile home.
Each state privilege tax contains varied and diverse provisions. In-
deed, such diversity is one of the strengths of the privilege tax structure.
Each state is able to adopt tax provisions in accordance with the financial
conditions of its residents. Each state is able to adopt an efficient and
equitable tax peculiarly appropriate to its mobile home residents. It is
beyond the scope of this comment to discuss most or even many of the
panoply of provisions which have been or could be adopted by the various
states. It is recognized, however, that a poorly drafted statute may dis-
criminate against or in favor of mobile home residents, or otherwise be in-
equitable. Such discriminatory and inequitable provisions are subject to
attack by courts and legislatures of the various states but are beyond the
scope of this comment. Rather, the comment concludes with some obser-
vations concerning the properly drafted and equitable privilege tax struc-
ture.
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First, the privilege tax approach imposes a tax and not a license fee
upon the mobile home owner. This tax imposition guarantees that the
governing body may collect revenue from the mobile home owner to be
used for the operation of all municipal services, regardless of whether or
not such service can be classified as a cost of regulating the mobile home.
Thus, needless controversy and litigation concerning the interpretation of
cost of regulation are avoided. The mobile home owner will pay his
share of the tax burden.
Second, the privilege tax, because it is a special tax imposed only on
the mobile home, can best provide for adequate assessment and enforce-
ment procedures suited to the nature of a mobile home. Thus, the prob-
lem of trying to administer assessment procedures which are adequate for
assessing other types of property but inefficient and unjust when applied
to the assessment of a mobile home is eliminated. The Colorado privilege
tax, for example, provides that the mobile home shall be assessed at 75
per cent of its retail delivered price minus a deduction of 20 per cent
which is allowed for cost of household furnishings. 140  The recognition of
a furnishings deduction is an equitable provision which is particularly
suitable to mobile homes and consequently most likely to be enacted only
by a privilege tax type statute. Illinois, in its privilege tax statute, elim-
inates many troublesome assessment problems by imposing a tax of ten
to fifteen cents per square foot of floor space upon the owner of the mo-
bile unit.1 4 1  This method avoids many complicated assessment compu-
tations yet guarantees that the owner of the larger and therefore more
expensive home pays a larger tax than the owner of a smaller and less
expensive unit. Thus, some degree of horizontal equity is established
without reference to factory suggested prices which, in the case of the
mobile home, are not only difficult to acquire but also inaccurate indica-
tions of the true value of the home.
Finally, the legislature which enacts the privilege tax either expressly
or impliedly recognizes that the mobile home is a particular and distinct
type of personal property. By designating a mobile home as a special
type of property, the legislature avoids the development of a needless
legal fiction as to the nature of the mobile housing unit. More impor-
tantly, the legislature which accepts the fact that mobile homes are a
special kind of property takes the initial step towards recognition of the
fact that mobiles provide decent and safe housing for many persons who
could not otherwise afford it. Such a legislature will realize that if the
140. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3-5(16)(17) (Supp. 1969).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 1I11 § 725 (1971).
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mobile home is to continue to fulfill this function, it must be subject only
to reasonable and fair methods of taxation. Consequently, such a legis-
lature will conclude that any tax which makes it impossible for the low
or lower medium income family to own a mobile home is unreasonable;
no tax which might accomplish such a result will be enacted by this legis-
lature. Such legislatures are needed to help keep the cost of mobile
home living reasonable, for, as Washington economic consultant Robinson
Newcomb observes, "[miobile homes have saved the day for us ...if
it weren't for mobiles, our housing problems would be much worse than
they already are."' 142
Donald Lee Mrozek
142. Mayer, supra note 120, at 126.
